First glimpse on cover of ZPol-Issue 4/2018 “New Normality?”

Here it is – the cover of the upcoming issue 4/2018 of the German Journal of Political Science. Coming out a year after our #StatEx2017-conference in Paris, it offers the written and revised versions of a big part of the contributions presented at the German Historical Institute, as well as some new articles. We are very excited and looking forward to comments and further discussions.

ZPol 4/2018-Cover “New Normality? State of Exception as Contemporary Government Technique”.

The issue is currently in production. As soon as the digital and printed versions are available, we will inform you here. For more information, click on the cover. You will be re-directed to the ZPol-Homepage.

New Normality? Perspectives on Contemporary Research on State of Exception

With the following text, we finally publish the concluding chapter of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique. The editors are happy to present this last piece of the outcome of the #StatEx-2017-Conference which was held in Paris at the German Historical Institute one year ago. The concluding chapter will be published – together with the other articles already presented on this blog – online first as the 4/2018-issue of the German Journal of Political Science. We wish to thank all the contributing authors as well as the Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation (Cologne), the Foundation for Science and Democracy (Kiel), the Minerva Center for the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions (Haifa) and the Goethe Institute in Paris for their precious support.

1. Some general considerations

As the contributions to this volume show, state of exception (SoE) is and has been a crucial phenomenon in governing modern and accordingly complex democratic societies. Being an important tool for crisis response, the practice of SoE occurs in situations when democratic societies are extremely vulnerable. Such vulnerability may exist due to internal or external threats, real or perceived threats, man-made or non-man-made threats. They can also crop up when societies are, generally speaking, exposed to significant change.

Therefore, SoE, as an instrument of crisis governance, has a fundamental impact on societies when they are in a fragile condition. Literally taken as a governance technique, SoE does not deal with fundamental crisis. By introducing far-reaching changes to the given political, institutional, and legal order, it can be seen as a veritable game-changer with regard to democratic foundations. What is striking is its ambivalence: SoE as a tool—in a very technical sense of the term—can resolve critical crisis situations that would otherwise have overstrained the existing political order. It can also serve as a door-opener by introducing fundamental changes to an authoritarian political system. It is in between these two extremes where the political capacity of SoE unfolds.

Taken together, these two elements—the omnipresence of SoE in contemporary democracies and its ambivalence regarding the purposes in which it might be used—require close and continued monitoring of techniques that rely on the enlargement of the executive’s competences. This leads to the following questions: How is it possible to organize such monitoring? What developments should it consider and what issues are the most important?

2. Monitoring SoE: Six theses

Monitoring the contemporary use of SoE as a government technique is a complex task. Owing to a variety of existing cases, it seems inappropriate to come up with a general research strategy that claims to cover all of them. Instead, we would like to propose six theses that, as we hope, may inspire future work on SoE.

The concept of SoE is not limited to the era of the modern state. Existing research on SoE generally admits that the Roman dictatorship was some sort of a predecessor of enlarged executive competences. Transferred to modern times by Machiavelli, the idea of suspending a given constitutional framework for enhancing its crisis intervention capacities can be traced back to the idea of the modern state. What is largely missing in this reconstruction is the whole period between the end of the classical era of the Roman Republic and the Italian Renaissance. Attempts to identify functional equivalents to the SoE in the Middle Ages—as Petra Schulte has shown regarding the term necessitas—may be fruitful to understand the rationale behind SoE beyond a developed, complex, and therefore, modern statehood.

SoE must not be reduced to legal issues. Of course, SoE is embedded in the constitutional or legal order of the state. Therefore, its legal layout is indispensable when it comes to analysing the specific form of a SoE. Anyway, the analysis should not stop there. The legal dimension of SoE often limits itself to the form of crisis intervention. But it often fails to fully grasp the performative dimension—the use that a specific government at a specific point in time makes of the given legal provisions.

Analysing language patterns of SoE is crucial. When it comes to opening the performative dimension of SoE, analysing language patterns is of utmost importance. Language patterns here means the way stakeholders argue or try to persuade the political public before, during, or after an emergency. Stakeholders are political decision-makers, but their critics are inside or outside the institutions of the political system. The analysis of language patterns should aim at the arguments or justifications issued in favour or against the application of a SoE as well as at the changes and volatility of these statements. Qualitative approaches will significantly enhance the understanding of the political dimension of SoE.

Considering the temporal dimensions of SoE is important. As already implicitly stated above, the analysis of SoE must not be limited to the timeframe covering nothing but the application of SoE. Not always, but very often, the application of a SoE knows a specific historical, political, environmental, or social record. It is, therefore, crucial to consider what one may call the the pre-existing conditions of a SoE. These might help to understand why a SoE in a specific situation was applied, although the same conditions at another point in time did not lead to the suspension of fundamental rights. Also, if the SoE can transform a democratic political system into an authoritarian one, the consecutive steps towards this degradation of a political culture require close monitoring. Taken together, any analysis of SoE must consider its pre-existing conditions and outcome.

Comparison matters. One may wonder why some political systems face a severe crisis proclaim a SoE and then, after the crisis is over, return to the normal, while others do not and become authoritarian. Existing studies very often limit themselves to one single case instead of comparing various applications of SoE over time or in different countries. Future studies should commit themselves to a comparative approach. This may help to identify specific constellations, risks, institutional, or political patterns that more or less lead towards a fundamental transformation of a democratic political system during the application of a SoE.

Normalization matters. Current cases of the application of a SoE show that respecting a strict timeframe of enhanced executive capacities and suspended fundamental rights is becoming less and less common. Even more, governments for months and years refrain from ending SoE regimes. When a SoE is terminated, this goes along with the transfer of important emergency provisions into the normal legal framework. One of the most difficult and most exiting questions is: Why is this? Why does it seem to become more and more difficult for governments to just end the emergency regime? Why do they consider it necessary to have access to the enhanced capacities of crisis intervention when a SoE is not applied? How do they justify that need? And finally, if the exception becomes the new normality, what is then normality?

These six theses do not need to be—and certainly cannot—be integrated into one single study. The methodological and disciplinary perspectives they require are too diverse. But they may serve as an orientation towards a contemporary study of SoE as a government technique in a broad sense—it means that an interdisciplinary project certainly needs more and ongoing attention.

3. Has the SoE become a ‘new normality’?

This volume started with the general assumption that SoE is on everyone’s lips. The various articles we have brought together have shown that—from an interdisciplinary, scientific point of view—this diagnosis is surely true. One can clearly see an increasing number of studies on SoE within the last years. They legal studies and constitutional right via philosophy to political sciences and sociology, from history to the history of ideas. Seen from an epistemological point of view, they reach from empirical via comparative up to critical normative perspectives. For all these fields with their various approaches, analysing SoE has already become an important preoccupation.

But if we look beyond this research-centred impression beyond the academic world, what about the relevance of SoE for the political practice of contemporary democracies? Is SoE really that important? Does it endanger the rule of law or even fundamentals of democracy itself? Giving an answer to these question is not so easy.

On the one hand, SoE was, is, and will be an indispensable institutional mechanism for crisis intervention. As of now, far more than 95 per cent of established democracies worldwide know constitutional provisions or legal rules for this purpose. Seeing it pragmatically, one must admit that as long as unforeseen events with the potential to expose democratic political systems to an existential threat will occur, the executive will have no reason to give up this tool. This is because the core function of the modern state is to protect its citizens. It seems almost tautological that it can only fulfil this function if it stays intact. There, the state and the acting government must dispose of appropriate tools to protect itself and its citizens even in situations that go far beyond the legal limits of the existing constitutional or legal order and the limits established by them: necessitas non habet legem.

On the other hand, given the current practice of democratic crisis intervention before, during, and after the application of emergency regimes, one aspect needs some more consideration. This aspect points to the trigger of the SoE itself: What is a crisis? Or, to be more precise: How do we frame a crisis situation and how do we legitimize the ultimate need for suspending fundamental legal norms and/or civil rights? To this end, it seems that the role of the political public is crucial when it comes to prevention of the anti-democratic force of an emergency regime. If, as it seems to be the case for contemporary democracies,

–       the political public adopts a more and more hostile pattern;

–       the segregation of the political sphere into a plurality of filter bubbles continues;

–       the willingness to accept so-called alternative facts as a legitimate description of political, social, and economic reality;

–       the acceptance of a friend–enemy distinction or other simplification as sufficient explanation for complex problems goes on, 

then there is a strongly increased likelihood for the success of governments intending to use SoE provisions for their own interests such as the long-term enhancement of their own influence at the expense of fundamental rights and separation of powers. A continued failure of the political public will enhance the chances for those governments to successfully create an image of constant threat, which makes it possible to use extensive use of emergency provisions plausible and more and more uncontested.

Looking back to the first two decades of the 21stcentury, the use of SoE in well- established democracies has clearly become a more and more frequent practice. This was often—for example, after the 9/11 attacks in the US or after the terrorist attacks on 11/13 in Paris—for good or at least for understandable reasons. What we can also observe is that SoE is not only applied after terror attacks or turmoil, but also in other cases like environmental or climate change issues or labour disputes. As the contexts that trigger the applications of SoE vary more and more, its timeframe grows. In recent years, SoE shows a clear tendency to remain in effect for even longer periods and to be maintained (at least in some of its provisions) even after the crisis is over.Given these patterns, SoE seems to be moving away from being a tool provided in emergency situations which is reserved for exceptional use only. Instead, the restraints to use it get weaker, which makes the SoE—in the medium or perhaps in the long run—a normal instrument for governing democracies. This is the point when we should once again emphasize a question that we have already come up with: If the exception is the new normality, what is then normality?

New Normality? – Abstract #16

Jonas Heller: Democracy and state of exceptionas dialectic between demos and population.

Within democratic orders, it is the declared aim of a state of exception to secure or restore the endangered foundation of democracy. The provided measures are undemocratic insofar they directly affect individual rights as the principle on which democracy is based. By suspending rights, the state of exception treats individuals not as members of a democratic community (demos), but as parts of a population which has to be secured. Whereas individuals rights enable individuals to be part of the demos, the state of exception – by restraining rights – enforces a politics of population. In my article, I show in what way individual rights, too, are used as a strategy of governing the population. Referring to the history of individual rights in the early modern period, I describe a specific form of alienation of individual rights. I argue that this alienation consists in the separation of a private from the political component of individual rights. This alienation is the reason for a dialectical shift from demosto populationwhich occurs in an extreme form in the state of exception. Against this background, the question of the state of exception and the question of individual rights appear in an unfamiliar but crucial relation. In order to oppose the dialectical shift and the misuse of exceptional measures, I claim it necessary to insist on the inextricable link between the private and the political component of individual rights – that is to extend the domain of democracy.

Das erklärte Ziel eines Ausnahmezustands besteht in demokratischen Rechtsstaaten darin, das bedrohte Fundament der demokratischen Ordnung zu sichern oder wiederherzustellen. Die mit diesem Ziel verbundenen Maßnahmen sind insofern undemokratisch, als sie direkt die individuellen Rechte und damit das Prinzip tangieren, auf denen die Demokratie beruht. Im Ausnahmezustand werden die Individuen – durch die Suspension ihrer Rechte – nicht als Mitglieder einer demokratischen Gemeinschaft (demos), sondern als Bestandteile einer zu sichernden Bevölkerung betrachtet. Befähigen die individuellen Rechte die Menschen dazu, Teil eines demoszu sein, forciert der Ausnahmezustand dagegen eine Politik der Bevölkerung. In meinem Aufsatz zeige ich, inwiefern individuelle Rechte allerdings nicht allein im Zustand ihrer Beschränkung, sondern auch ihrer Gewährung als Mittel genutzt werden können, um Bevölkerung zu regulieren. Hierzu beschreibe ich im Rückgriff auf die frühneuzeitliche Geschichte individueller Rechte eine spezifische Form ihrer Entfremdung, die in einer Spaltung innerhalb der Rechte besteht: in der Trennung ihres privaten von ihrem politischen Moment. In dieser Entfremdung liegt die Möglichkeit für einen dialektischen Umschlag vom demoszur bloßen Bevölkerung, der sich im Ausnahmezustand in extremer Form realisiert. Ausnahmezustand und individuelle Rechte erscheinen vor diesem Hintergrund in einem ungewohnten, doch für ihr Verständnis entscheidenden Verhältnis. Dieses Verständnis hat auch praktische Konsequenzen, denn um dem Missbrauch von Ausnahmemaßnahmen entgegenzutreten, ist es gerade notwendig, auf dem unlösbaren Zusammenhang des privaten und des politischen Moments individueller Rechte zu insistieren – und das heißt, den Bereich der Demokratie zu erweitern.

Keywords: state of exception, population, freedom, security, Michel Foucault.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #15

Julian Müller: European Human Rights Protection in Times of Terrorism—the State of Emergency and the Emergency Clause of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Like most human rights treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) contains an emergency clause (Art. 15 ECHR). This clause defines the conditions for—and the limits of—a derogation from the human rights obligations under the convention in the case of an emergency. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the state of emergency (état d’urgence) was declared in France and maintained in force till 1 November 2017. In many cases, the counterterrorism measures adopted by the French authorities interfered with the rights set forth in the Convention. The question arises as to whether the interference could be justified by the state of emergency or whether the Convention was violated. This article analyzes the most important groups of cases: house searches, house arrests, and bans on demonstrations. As a result, it can be shown that the situation in France satisfied the criteria for a lawful derogation from the ECHR. However, some of the actual measures seem to have gone beyond what was strictly necessary and, so, violated the Convention. This particular case may also give some indication of the role that international and European human rights regimes can play in balancing fundamental rights and measures in the “fight against terrorism.”

Menschenrechtsregime eine Notstandsklausel (Art. 15 EMRK). Diese Vorschrift regelt, unter welchen Voraussetzungen und in welchem Umfang Konventionsstaaten von den menschenrechtlichen Gewährleistungen im Notstandsfall abweichen können. Nach den Terroranschlägen in Paris vom 13. November 2015 wurde in Frankreich der Ausnahmezustand (état d’urgence) verhängt und bis zum 1. November 2017 mehrmals verlängert. Die von den französischen Sicherheitsbehörden ergriffenen Maßnahmen zur Terrorabwehr haben in vielen Fällen in Konventionsrechte von Bürgern eingegriffen. In diesen Fällen stellt sich die Frage, ob die Eingriffe durch den Ausnahmezustand gerechtfertigt waren oder die Konvention verletzt wurde. Dieser Artikel untersucht die Vereinbarkeit mit der EMRK für die drei wichtigsten Fallgruppen. Hausdurchsuchungen, Hausarrest und Versammlungsverbote. Im Ergebnis kann gezeigt werden, dass die Situation in Frankreich die Voraussetzungen für eine Derogation von der EMRK erfüllte. Einige der konkreten Maßnahmen griffen jedoch unverhältnismäßig in Konventionsrechte ein. Dieser spezielle Fall kann auch Hinweise darauf geben, welche Rolle internationale und europäische Menschenrechtsregime in der Abwägung von Grundrechten und Maßnahmen im „Kampf gegen den Terrorismus“ einnehmen können.

Keywords: European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 15 ECHR, état d’urgence/state of emergency, terrorism, France.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #14

Jan Christoph Suntrup: The Symbolic Politics of the State of Exception: Images and Performances.

This article discusses selected examples of the state of exception’s symbolic embeddedness and symbolic performances related to it. After suggesting a revision of a simplistic understanding of the term “symbolic politics” as developed by Murray Edelman and others who confine symbolic action mainly to the realm of deception and manipulation, the symbolic force of rhetoric in exceptional times will be demonstrated by looking at recent examples from the French context. In a next step, the article will shed light on typical rituals of community-building, reassurance, and resilience after terrorist attacks before turning to the staging of political leadership in times of emergency. Moreover, the ambivalent and controversial use of images in the course of the “War on Terror” will be addressed. Lastly, the symbolic side of securitization animated by emergency narratives, which comes to the fore in the building of new security walls and especially in the military reconstruction of large cities, will be discussed.

Dieser Artikel widmet sich ausgewählten Fällen, in denen die symbolische Einbettung des Ausnahmezustands und ihn begleitende symbolische Handlungen zur Geltung kommen. Im Anschluss an ein Plädoyer für eine Revision traditioneller Vorstellungen von „Symbolpolitik“, die im Anschluss an Murray Edelman und andere Autoren häufig ins Reich der Täuschung und Manipulation verwiesen wird, analysiert der Artikel zunächst zwei jüngere Beispiele aus Frankreich, die die symbolische Kraft der Rhetorik im Ausnahmezustand demonstrieren. Anschließend sollen typische Rituale der Gemeinschaftsbildung, kollektiven Selbstvergewisserung und Selbstbehauptung nach Terroranschlägen beleuchtet werden, bevor die Inszenierung politischer Führungskompetenzen in Ausnahmesituationen in den Fokus rückt. Der Analyse des ambivalenten und kontroversen Einsatzes von Bildern im Laufe des Kriegs gegen den Terror folgt schließlich ein Blick auf die symbolische Dimension der häufig auf den Ausnahmezustand rekurrierenden gegenwärtigen Sicherheitspolitik, die sich in neuen Mauern und Schutzwällen, aber auch besonders der militärischen Umgestaltung großer Städte zeigt.

Keywords: Symbolic Politics, Rituals, Staging of Authority, Friend/Enemy Distinction, Securitization.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #13

Dante Gatmaytan: Duterte, Judicial Deference, and Democratic Decay in the Philippines

Democracy in the Philippines is in a state of decay. As with many other nations, the Constitution contains provisions allowing the Chief Executive to place the country or any part thereof in a state of exception in case of emergencies. This, however, is not a problem because the Constitution likewise ordained a system of checks and balances. To stave off abuse, the Judiciary, a co-equal branch of the Executive, was empowered to review any exercise by the President of its emergency powers. This paper provides an analysis of recent jurisprudence to illustrate the refusal of the Supreme Court to play this vital role and its concomitant effect on democracy.

Die Demokratie auf den Philippinen befindet sich in einem Zustand des Verfalls. Wie bei vielen anderen Nationen enthält die Verfassung Bestimmungen, die es dem Chef der Exekutive erlauben, das Land oder einen Teil davon im Falle von Notfällen in einen Ausnahmezustand zu versetzen. Dies ist jedoch eigentlich kein Problem, da die Verfassung ebenfalls ein System der gegenseitigen Kontrolle vorsieht. Um Missbrauch abzuwehren, wurde die der Exekutive gleichberechtigte Judikative ermächtigt, jede Ausübung der Notstandsbefugnisse durch den Präsidenten zu überprüfen. Dieser Artikel bietet eine Analyse der jüngsten Rechtsprechung, um die Weigerung des Obersten Gerichtshofs zu veranschaulichen, diese wichtige Rolle wahrzunehmen und die damit einhergehenden Auswirkungen auf die Demokratie zu verdeutlichen.

Keywords: Duterte, judicial deference, democracy, emergency powers, constitution, martial law.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #12

Annette Förster: The Expansion of Executive Force in the War on Terror and its Impact on Domestic and International Norms.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, the United States have been in a continuing state of emergency. The formal state of exception is one element of a two-headed development: the expansion of executive force accompanied by the reduction of democratic control mechanisms and legal protections from abuse. The balance of power between the branches has shifted and the limits of the legitimate exercise of state force have become blurred. In the process of re-balancing liberty and security in the face of an exceptional threat, fundamental principles of the US democratic system and of international law, such as the right to privacy, due process, or the prohibition of torture have been limited and violated. Are these measures necessary to counter terrorism effectively or do they jeopardize what shall be protected: the liberal democratic tradition and constitution of the United States? I argue that rather than ensuring security, the two-headed development erodes founding stones of the US democratic system – liberty, equality, due process, the rule of law, the separation of powers in a system of checks and balances. They impair the enforcement of international norms and complicate international cooperation.

Seit den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 befinden sich die USA im Ausnahmezustand. Der formale Ausnahmezustand ist ein Element einer zweiteiligen Entwicklung: die Expansion exekutiver Gewalt, einhergehend mit der Schwächung demokratischer Kontroll- und rechtlicher Schutzmechanismen gegen den Missbrauch dieser Gewalt. Die Balance zwischen den Gewalten hat sich verschoben und die Grenzen legitimer Gewaltausübung sind verschwommen. Im Prozess einer neuen Ausbalancierung von Freiheit und Sicherheit in Anbetracht der terroristischen Bedrohung wurden grundlegende Prinzipien des demokratischen Systems der USA sowie des Völkerrechts eingeschränkt und verletzt, darunter das Recht auf Privatheit, auf ein faires Verfahren oder das Folterverbot. Sind dies notwendige Maßnahmen um Terrorismus effektiv zu begegnen oder setzen sie vielmehr aufs Spiel, was es zu verteidigen gilt: die liberal-demokratische Tradition und Verfassung der USA? Statt Sicherheit zu gewährleisten, so mein Argument, untergräbt diese zweiteilige Entwicklung Grundsteine des demokratischen Systems der USA – Freiheit, Gleichheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit sowie Gewaltenteilung in einem System gegenseitiger Kontrolle. Sie schwächt internationale Normen und erschwert internationale Zusammenarbeit.

Keywords: State of exception, USA, War on Terror, democracy, norms.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #11

Ece Göztepe: The Permanency of the State of Emergency in Turkey. The Rise of a Constituent Power or Only a New Quality of the State?

Working on the state of emergency/exception requires inevitably an idea of normality. For the first time the Roman law came up with the idea of ruling the state of exception before the exceptional conditions emerge and the Romans decided to locate the exceptional power beside the normal system. Even the terms and the content of the exceptional powers of the Roman dictators have been changed over time, the separation of their extra-legal powers from the regular system and the system-intern control of these powers stayed the core of the regulations. On the other hand, most of the modern constitutional states have preferred to locate the exceptional, mostly executive powers, within the system and guaranteed a parliamentary and especially judicial control over the use of these constitution-based powers. So, the normative rules on the state of exception in modern constitutional states are still a dependent variable. The state of emergency regimes is seen as a special form of upholding the rule of law principles and are bounded to the status quo with help of the courts.This article examines the evolution of the normative regulations of the state of emergency in Turkey in the light of the jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court. Despite the constitutional restriction in Article 148 par. 1 that forbids the constitutionality control of the emergency decrees by the Constitutional Court the Turkish Constitution of 1982 could have also been subordinated to the system of modern constitutional states. The articlesummarizes the interpretation of the restrictive constitutional norms by the Turkish Constitutional Court in the 1990’s in a very progressive way. In the second part I analyse the content of the thirty-two state of emergency decrees as of the attempted coup d’état in July 15th, 2016 and show the shift from the state of exception regime under the rule of law to the non-revolutionary constituent power without any legal restrictions. The main subject of this analysis is to show the “legal revolutionary effect” of the TCC decisions after October 2016 which have abandoned its former concept of the constitutional limits of the emergency regimes and in fact give up its own functional existence and legitimacy within the constitutional system.

Das Nachdenken über den Ausnahmezustand bedingt unvermeidlich die Idee der Normalität. Zunächst brachte das römische Recht die Idee zur Regelung des Ausnahmezustandes vor dem Erscheinen der Ausnahmezustände hervor und platzierte die Ausnahmekompetenzen außerhalb des normalen Systems. Auch wenn die Amtszeit und die Kompetenzen des römischen Diktators sich im Laufe der Zeit änderten, blieb die Unterscheidung zwischen den Ausnahmeregelungen und dem normalen Rechtssystem sowie die systeminterne Kontrolle der Ausnahmekompetenzen das Hauptmerkmal des römischen Systems. Auf der anderen Seite haben die meisten Verfassungsstaaten Ausnahmezustandsregelungen mit erweiterten Exekutivkompetenzen innerhalb des Rechtssystems bevorzugt, die parlamentarischer sowie judikativer Kontrolle unterworfen sind. Somit sind solche Kompetenzen in modernen Verfassungsstaaten immer abhängige Variablen in Bezug auf die reguläre Rechtsordnung. Die Ausnahmezustandsregime werden in dieser Hinsicht als eine spezielle Form zur Aufrechterhaltung des Rechtsstaates betrachtet und sind durch die judikative Kontrolle dem status quo unterworfen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklung der normativen Regelungen zum Ausnahmezustand in der Türkei unter Bezugnahme der Rechtsprechung des Türkischen Verfassungsgerichts. Auch wenn Art. 148 Abs. 1 der Verfassung die Verfassungsmäßigkeitskontrolle von Ausnahmerechtsverordnungen verbietet, kann die Türkische Verfassung von 1982 zu modernen Verfassungsstaaten gezählt werden. Der Beitrag fasst die progressive Auslegung der genannten restriktiven Verfassungsregelungen durch das Türkische Verfassungsgericht in den 1990er Jahren zusammen. Im zweiten Teil wird der Übergang zu einer weniger progressiven Rechtsprechung ab 2015 erklärt. Im Anschluss wird der Rückzug vom Ausnahmezustand im Rahmen des Rechtsstaates zu einer nicht-revolutionären verfassungsgebenden Gewalt ohne normative Schranken anhand der dreiundzwanzig Ausnahmerechtsverordnungen nach dem versuchten Putsch am 15. Juli 2016 analysiert. Das Hauptanliegen dieser Analyse liegt darin, die Wirkung der verfassungsgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung nach Oktober 2016 zu zeigen, die an einer „legalen Revolution“ grenzt und den Ausnahmezustand seinen verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen entledigt hat. Im Endeffekt kommt dies der Selbstaufgabe der funktionalen Existenz und Legitimität des Verfassungsgerichts im Rechtssystem gleich.

Keywords: Turkey, state of emergency, constitution.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #10

Elisa Bertolini: Democracy and the State of Exception. The Italian experience.

The Italian experience offers some interesting insights when dealing with the state of exception and emergency situations. The 1948 Constitution does not provide for any emergency section. Nevertheless, it provides for instruments to enact whenever a situation of necessity and urgency occurs. What is peculiar of the Italian experience is the misuse (or abuse) of the law decree, which has established a governmental legislation. A more recent practice has been to resort to emergency instruments even in situations that are not properly emergencies, but rather just difficult to handle, where the connection to the extraordinary character of the situation is lacking. This anomaly has been criticized by courts, thereby leading the Parliament to amend the legislation. Moreover, the present-day economic crisis has led to the twisting of the form of government (and of State) in situations of emergency with respect to the role of the President of the Republic and of the Constitutional Court.

Der Fall Italien bietet einige interessante Einblicke in aktuelle Entwicklungen zu Ausnahme- und Notfallsituationen. Die Verfassung von 1948 sieht keine Regelung zum Ausnahmezustand vor. Nichtsdestoweniger ermöglicht sie Verfahren, die angewandt werden können, wann immer eine Krisensituation dies erfordert. Was den italienischen Fall im Kern ausmacht, ist der Missbrauch eines Gesetzesdekrets, mit dem eine Regierungsgesetzgebung ermöglicht wurde. Daran hat sich eine Praxis angeschlossen, die den Einsatz von Notfallinstrumenten sogar dann ermöglicht, wenn es sich nicht um Notfälle handelt und ein außergewöhnlicher Charakter fehlt. Diese Anomalie wurde von den Gerichten kritisiert, was das Parlament dazu veranlasste, die Gesetzgebung zu ändern. Die gegenwärtige Wirtschaftskrise hat jedoch dazu geführt, dass sich die Regierungspraxis in Notlagen in Bezug auf die Rolle des Präsidenten der Republik und des Verfassungsgerichts zugunsten der Exekutive verlagert hat.

Keywords: governmental legislation, emergency orders, President of the Republic, Constitutional Court, form of government.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #9

Myriam FeinbergStates of Emergency in France and Israel—Terrorism, “permanent emergencies,” and democracy

This article examines the consequences on democracy of “permanent emergencies” linked to terrorism, through the examples and a comparison of France and Israel’s states of emergency (SoE). France was under a SoE for two years. Israel has been under a SoE since its creation in 1948. In both cases, a new terrorism law was adopted which was intended to replace the SoE but which, in fact, enshrined a number of emergency measures into regular legislation. The article includes a comparative examination of the SoE regimes in France and Israel in their relationship with counterterrorism. It then focuses on three angles to provide an analysis of the consequences on rule of law principles of continued SoE adopted or used for counterterrorism purposes: The suspension of the principle of separation of powers, both in SoE regimes and in counterterrorism in general; the confusion between legal categories and the tendency to treat terrorism as an exceptional threat, which requires an exceptional response; and the tendency to focus on terrorism as an external threat, which leads to discriminatory measures.

Dieser Artikel untersucht die Folgen eines “permanenten Ausnahmezustandes” (State of Exception – SoE) im Zusammenhang mit Terrorismus für die Demokratie anhand des Vergleichs der Ausnahmezustände in Frankreich und Israel. Während Frankreich sich zwei Jahre lang im Ausnahmezustand befand, gilt dies für Israel seit seiner Gründung im Jahr 1948. In beiden Fällen wurde ein neues Terrorismusgesetz verabschiedet, das den Ausnahmezustand ersetzen sollte, aber in Wirklichkeit eine Reihe von Notfallmaßnahmen in reguläre Rechtsvorschriften aufnahm. Der Artikel enthält eine vergleichende Untersuchung der Ausnahmezustandsregime in Frankreich und Israel in ihrer Beziehung zur Terrorismusbekämpfung. Anschließend werden drei Aspekte analysiert, um eine Analyse der Konsequenzen für rechtsstaatliche Prinzipien im Rahmen der Verstetigung des Ausnahmezustandes zu liefern, wie sie zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus angenommen oder angewandt werden: Aufhebung des Prinzips der Gewaltenteilung sowohl in Ausnahmezustandsregimen als auch in der Terrorismusbekämpfung im Allgemeinen; die Verwirrung zwischen den Rechtskategorien und der Tendenz, den Terrorismus als außergewöhnliche Bedrohung zu betrachten, die eine außergewöhnliche Reaktion erfordert; und die Tendenz, sich auf den Terrorismus als externe Bedrohung zu konzentrieren, was zu diskriminierenden Maßnahmen führt.

Keywords: State of emergency, Terrorism, France, Israel, Permanent emergencies.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

Suche in OpenEdition Search

Sie werden weitergeleitet zur OpenEdition Search