Frankreich – Kommt der Ausnahmezustand zurück?

Graffiti nach einer Demonstration auf dem Boulevard Beaumarchais (2017).

Am 1. Dezember 2018 kam es in verschiedenen französischen Städten, darunter insbesondere in Paris, zu gewaltsamen Ausschreitungen, Körperverletzungen und erheblichen Sachbeschädigungen anlässlich des dritten Protesttages der Bewegung der gilets jaunes. Im Nachgang hat das französische Kabinett am auf die Ausschreitungen folgenden Sonntag über geeignete Maßnahmen beraten. Dabei kursierte unter anderem die Überlegung, zur effektiven Verhinderung weiterer Gewalttaten den Ausnahmezustand („état d’urgence“) zu verhängen. Zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt hat Präsident Macron von der Verhängung des Ausnahmezustandes Abstand genommen und stattdessen politische Zugeständnisse gemacht – unter anderem in Form der Verschiebung des Inkrafttretens der geplanten Ökosteuer.

Was aber, wenn es in den folgenden Tagen oder Wochen zu weiteren, ähnlich gewalttätigen Ausschreitungen kommt? Wird die französische Regierung wieder auf einen Ausnahmezustand zurückgreifen? – Drei zentrale Gründe sprechen dagegen.

Erstens – Der Ausnahmezustand, wie er durch das Gesetz 358/55 bestimmt wird, ist in der späten Vierten und fast in der gesamten Fünften Republik immer im Zusammenhang mit Dekolonialisierungskonflikten angewandt worden. Sei es im Kontext des Algerienkrieges (1954-62), sei es im Zusammenhang mit den Bestrebungen nach mehr Unabhängigkeit Neukaledoniens (1984-88) oder auch im Kontext der Vorstadtunruhen 2005/6 – immer waren koloniale oder postkoloniale Konflikte ursächlich. Erst der Ausnahmezustand von 2015-17 hat das geändert. Aber auch hier ging es um die Auseinandersetzung mit einem externen Gegner, dem sogenannten Islamischen Staat. Auf politisch-symbolischer Ebene könnte es sich für die Präsidentschaft Macrons als desaströs erweisen, den Ausnahmezustand angesichts dieser bislang klaren Außenorientierung nun in einem innenpolitischen Konflikt einzusetzen.

Zweitens – Infolge der Anschläge auf das Stade de France, auf verschiedene Straßencafés im 10. und 11. Arrondissement und auf das Bataclan wurde in Frankreich am 13. November 2015 der Ausnahmezustand verhängt. Nach sechsmaliger Verlängerung ist dieser am 31. Oktober 2017 und damit nach einer Dauer von 719 ausgelaufen. Mit diesem extrem langen Ausnahmezustand ging eine signifikante Verschärfung der Gesetzgebung zur Inneren Sicherheit in Frankreich einher. Seit dem 1. November 2017 enthält der Code de la Sécurité Intérieure nach einer Gesetzesvorlage (2017-1510) mehrere Bestimmungen, die vorher nur im Ausnahmezustand gegolten hatten – etwa jene, die Bewegungsfreiheit im öffentlichen Raum einschränken oder religiöse Stätten auf Exekutivbeschluss schließen zu können. Insbesondere die ausgedehnten Kontrollmöglichkeiten sowie Zugangsbeschränkungen des öffentlichen Raumes, die mitunter auch als Normalisierung des Ausnahmezustandes charakterisiert werden, müssten hinreichende Interventionsmöglichkeiten auf Seiten der Exekutive beinhalten, ohne dass es noch der gesonderten Ausrufung des Ausnahmezustandes bedarf.

Drittens – Emmanuel Macron hat von seinem Vorgänger François Hollande bei Amtsübernahme am 14. Mai 2017 jenen Ausnahmezustand geerbt, den sein Vorgänger noch unter dem Eindruck der andauernden Geiselnahme im Bataclan-Theater in der Nacht vom 13. auf den 14. November 2015 verhängt hatte. Macron weiß daher, wie schwierig und politisch risikoreich es ist, einen einmal verhängten Ausnahmezustand wieder zu verlassen. Angesichts einer massiven Versicherheitlichung des öffentlichen Diskurses ist der Ausnahmezustand das größtmögliche Sicherheitsversprechen des Staates in Friedenszeiten. Sollte nach seiner Beendigung eine größere Krise – verursacht etwa durch einen Terrorakt – eintreten, wäre die Glaubwürdigkeit des hierfür verantwortlichen Politikers irreparabel beschädigt. Macron ist sich dieses Zusammenhangs bewusst. Der Weg, den er zur Beendigung des von Hollande geerbten Ausnahmezustandes in Form einer Normalisierung zentraler ausnahmezustandlicher Maßnahmen gewählt hat, macht dies deutlich.

Die Summe dieser drei Argumente lässt eine neuerliche Verhängung des Ausnahmezustandes selbst bei anhaltenden Protesten der sogenannten „Gelbwesten“ eher wenig wahrscheinlich erscheinen.

First glimpse on cover of ZPol-Issue 4/2018 „New Normality?“

Here it is – the cover of the upcoming issue 4/2018 of the German Journal of Political Science. Coming out a year after our #StatEx2017-conference in Paris, it offers the written and revised versions of a big part of the contributions presented at the German Historical Institute, as well as some new articles. We are very excited and looking forward to comments and further discussions.

ZPol 4/2018-Cover „New Normality? State of Exception as Contemporary Government Technique“.

The issue is currently in production. As soon as the digital and printed versions are available, we will inform you here. For more information, click on the cover. You will be re-directed to the ZPol-Homepage.

CfA: Wiss. Referent/in, EG 13 TV-AVH, 100%, am IFSH

Für den neuen Arbeitsbereich Innere Sicherheit und gesellschaftlicher Frieden sucht das Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH) zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt in Vollzeit eine/n Postdoc. Die Stelle ist auf fünf Jahre nach dem WissZeitVG befristet.

Thematisch sucht das IFSH mit einem breiten Fokus auf Innere Sicherheit, Sicherheitsbedingungen, Risiko, Technologien oder Überwachung, gerne auch mit Affinität zur Politischen Theorie, zur Ausnahmezustands- oder Polizeiforschung.

Die detaillierte Ausschreibung kann hier heruntergeladen werden.

New Normality? Perspectives on Contemporary Research on State of Exception

With the following text, we finally publish the concluding chapter of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique. The editors are happy to present this last piece of the outcome of the #StatEx-2017-Conference which was held in Paris at the German Historical Institute one year ago. The concluding chapter will be published – together with the other articles already presented on this blog – online first as the 4/2018-issue of the German Journal of Political Science. We wish to thank all the contributing authors as well as the Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation (Cologne), the Foundation for Science and Democracy (Kiel), the Minerva Center for the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions (Haifa) and the Goethe Institute in Paris for their precious support.

1. Some general considerations

As the contributions to this volume show, state of exception (SoE) is and has been a crucial phenomenon in governing modern and accordingly complex democratic societies. Being an important tool for crisis response, the practice of SoE occurs in situations when democratic societies are extremely vulnerable. Such vulnerability may exist due to internal or external threats, real or perceived threats, man-made or non-man-made threats. They can also crop up when societies are, generally speaking, exposed to significant change.

Therefore, SoE, as an instrument of crisis governance, has a fundamental impact on societies when they are in a fragile condition. Literally taken as a governance technique, SoE does not deal with fundamental crisis. By introducing far-reaching changes to the given political, institutional, and legal order, it can be seen as a veritable game-changer with regard to democratic foundations. What is striking is its ambivalence: SoE as a tool—in a very technical sense of the term—can resolve critical crisis situations that would otherwise have overstrained the existing political order. It can also serve as a door-opener by introducing fundamental changes to an authoritarian political system. It is in between these two extremes where the political capacity of SoE unfolds.

Taken together, these two elements—the omnipresence of SoE in contemporary democracies and its ambivalence regarding the purposes in which it might be used—require close and continued monitoring of techniques that rely on the enlargement of the executive’s competences. This leads to the following questions: How is it possible to organize such monitoring? What developments should it consider and what issues are the most important?

2. Monitoring SoE: Six theses

Monitoring the contemporary use of SoE as a government technique is a complex task. Owing to a variety of existing cases, it seems inappropriate to come up with a general research strategy that claims to cover all of them. Instead, we would like to propose six theses that, as we hope, may inspire future work on SoE.

The concept of SoE is not limited to the era of the modern state. Existing research on SoE generally admits that the Roman dictatorship was some sort of a predecessor of enlarged executive competences. Transferred to modern times by Machiavelli, the idea of suspending a given constitutional framework for enhancing its crisis intervention capacities can be traced back to the idea of the modern state. What is largely missing in this reconstruction is the whole period between the end of the classical era of the Roman Republic and the Italian Renaissance. Attempts to identify functional equivalents to the SoE in the Middle Ages—as Petra Schulte has shown regarding the term necessitas—may be fruitful to understand the rationale behind SoE beyond a developed, complex, and therefore, modern statehood.

SoE must not be reduced to legal issues. Of course, SoE is embedded in the constitutional or legal order of the state. Therefore, its legal layout is indispensable when it comes to analysing the specific form of a SoE. Anyway, the analysis should not stop there. The legal dimension of SoE often limits itself to the form of crisis intervention. But it often fails to fully grasp the performative dimension—the use that a specific government at a specific point in time makes of the given legal provisions.

Analysing language patterns of SoE is crucial. When it comes to opening the performative dimension of SoE, analysing language patterns is of utmost importance. Language patterns here means the way stakeholders argue or try to persuade the political public before, during, or after an emergency. Stakeholders are political decision-makers, but their critics are inside or outside the institutions of the political system. The analysis of language patterns should aim at the arguments or justifications issued in favour or against the application of a SoE as well as at the changes and volatility of these statements. Qualitative approaches will significantly enhance the understanding of the political dimension of SoE.

Considering the temporal dimensions of SoE is important. As already implicitly stated above, the analysis of SoE must not be limited to the timeframe covering nothing but the application of SoE. Not always, but very often, the application of a SoE knows a specific historical, political, environmental, or social record. It is, therefore, crucial to consider what one may call the the pre-existing conditions of a SoE. These might help to understand why a SoE in a specific situation was applied, although the same conditions at another point in time did not lead to the suspension of fundamental rights. Also, if the SoE can transform a democratic political system into an authoritarian one, the consecutive steps towards this degradation of a political culture require close monitoring. Taken together, any analysis of SoE must consider its pre-existing conditions and outcome.

Comparison matters. One may wonder why some political systems face a severe crisis proclaim a SoE and then, after the crisis is over, return to the normal, while others do not and become authoritarian. Existing studies very often limit themselves to one single case instead of comparing various applications of SoE over time or in different countries. Future studies should commit themselves to a comparative approach. This may help to identify specific constellations, risks, institutional, or political patterns that more or less lead towards a fundamental transformation of a democratic political system during the application of a SoE.

Normalization matters. Current cases of the application of a SoE show that respecting a strict timeframe of enhanced executive capacities and suspended fundamental rights is becoming less and less common. Even more, governments for months and years refrain from ending SoE regimes. When a SoE is terminated, this goes along with the transfer of important emergency provisions into the normal legal framework. One of the most difficult and most exiting questions is: Why is this? Why does it seem to become more and more difficult for governments to just end the emergency regime? Why do they consider it necessary to have access to the enhanced capacities of crisis intervention when a SoE is not applied? How do they justify that need? And finally, if the exception becomes the new normality, what is then normality?

These six theses do not need to be—and certainly cannot—be integrated into one single study. The methodological and disciplinary perspectives they require are too diverse. But they may serve as an orientation towards a contemporary study of SoE as a government technique in a broad sense—it means that an interdisciplinary project certainly needs more and ongoing attention.

3. Has the SoE become a ‘new normality’?

This volume started with the general assumption that SoE is on everyone’s lips. The various articles we have brought together have shown that—from an interdisciplinary, scientific point of view—this diagnosis is surely true. One can clearly see an increasing number of studies on SoE within the last years. They legal studies and constitutional right via philosophy to political sciences and sociology, from history to the history of ideas. Seen from an epistemological point of view, they reach from empirical via comparative up to critical normative perspectives. For all these fields with their various approaches, analysing SoE has already become an important preoccupation.

But if we look beyond this research-centred impression beyond the academic world, what about the relevance of SoE for the political practice of contemporary democracies? Is SoE really that important? Does it endanger the rule of law or even fundamentals of democracy itself? Giving an answer to these question is not so easy.

On the one hand, SoE was, is, and will be an indispensable institutional mechanism for crisis intervention. As of now, far more than 95 per cent of established democracies worldwide know constitutional provisions or legal rules for this purpose. Seeing it pragmatically, one must admit that as long as unforeseen events with the potential to expose democratic political systems to an existential threat will occur, the executive will have no reason to give up this tool. This is because the core function of the modern state is to protect its citizens. It seems almost tautological that it can only fulfil this function if it stays intact. There, the state and the acting government must dispose of appropriate tools to protect itself and its citizens even in situations that go far beyond the legal limits of the existing constitutional or legal order and the limits established by them: necessitas non habet legem.

On the other hand, given the current practice of democratic crisis intervention before, during, and after the application of emergency regimes, one aspect needs some more consideration. This aspect points to the trigger of the SoE itself: What is a crisis? Or, to be more precise: How do we frame a crisis situation and how do we legitimize the ultimate need for suspending fundamental legal norms and/or civil rights? To this end, it seems that the role of the political public is crucial when it comes to prevention of the anti-democratic force of an emergency regime. If, as it seems to be the case for contemporary democracies,

–       the political public adopts a more and more hostile pattern;

–       the segregation of the political sphere into a plurality of filter bubbles continues;

–       the willingness to accept so-called alternative facts as a legitimate description of political, social, and economic reality;

–       the acceptance of a friend–enemy distinction or other simplification as sufficient explanation for complex problems goes on, 

then there is a strongly increased likelihood for the success of governments intending to use SoE provisions for their own interests such as the long-term enhancement of their own influence at the expense of fundamental rights and separation of powers. A continued failure of the political public will enhance the chances for those governments to successfully create an image of constant threat, which makes it possible to use extensive use of emergency provisions plausible and more and more uncontested.

Looking back to the first two decades of the 21stcentury, the use of SoE in well- established democracies has clearly become a more and more frequent practice. This was often—for example, after the 9/11 attacks in the US or after the terrorist attacks on 11/13 in Paris—for good or at least for understandable reasons. What we can also observe is that SoE is not only applied after terror attacks or turmoil, but also in other cases like environmental or climate change issues or labour disputes. As the contexts that trigger the applications of SoE vary more and more, its timeframe grows. In recent years, SoE shows a clear tendency to remain in effect for even longer periods and to be maintained (at least in some of its provisions) even after the crisis is over.Given these patterns, SoE seems to be moving away from being a tool provided in emergency situations which is reserved for exceptional use only. Instead, the restraints to use it get weaker, which makes the SoE—in the medium or perhaps in the long run—a normal instrument for governing democracies. This is the point when we should once again emphasize a question that we have already come up with: If the exception is the new normality, what is then normality?

HS Bund: Neue Unterrichtsmaterialien online

Lehrunterlagen 15.14.

Die Unterrichtsmaterialien für die Lehrveranstaltung 15.14 „Freiheitsrechte in der polizeilichen Sicherheitspraxis II“ sind ab sofort online verfügbar. Zum Online-Kursraum gelangen Sie hier. Zum Öffnen der Dokumente (pdf-Format) benötigen Sie ein Passwort, das im Rahmen der ersten Unterrichtsstunde bekannt gegeben wird.

Die Lehrunterlagen (LU) sind identisch mit denen, die sich auch im Reader befinden (außer LU4, diese ist nur online verfügbar). Falls erforderlich, können allerdings lediglich die online verfügbaren Dokumente aktualisiert werden, nicht jedoch die in Papierform vorliegenden. Bitte beachten Sie zudem, dass die Texte (TXT 1-6), die als Grundlage für die Gruppenarbeiten dienen, nur noch online angeboten werden.

Bei Fragen oder technischen Problemen wenden Sie sich bitte an die Ihnen bekannte Email-Adresse.

New Normality? – Abstract #16

Jonas Heller: Democracy and state of exceptionas dialectic between demos and population.

Within democratic orders, it is the declared aim of a state of exception to secure or restore the endangered foundation of democracy. The provided measures are undemocratic insofar they directly affect individual rights as the principle on which democracy is based. By suspending rights, the state of exception treats individuals not as members of a democratic community (demos), but as parts of a population which has to be secured. Whereas individuals rights enable individuals to be part of the demos, the state of exception – by restraining rights – enforces a politics of population. In my article, I show in what way individual rights, too, are used as a strategy of governing the population. Referring to the history of individual rights in the early modern period, I describe a specific form of alienation of individual rights. I argue that this alienation consists in the separation of a private from the political component of individual rights. This alienation is the reason for a dialectical shift from demosto populationwhich occurs in an extreme form in the state of exception. Against this background, the question of the state of exception and the question of individual rights appear in an unfamiliar but crucial relation. In order to oppose the dialectical shift and the misuse of exceptional measures, I claim it necessary to insist on the inextricable link between the private and the political component of individual rights – that is to extend the domain of democracy.

Das erklärte Ziel eines Ausnahmezustands besteht in demokratischen Rechtsstaaten darin, das bedrohte Fundament der demokratischen Ordnung zu sichern oder wiederherzustellen. Die mit diesem Ziel verbundenen Maßnahmen sind insofern undemokratisch, als sie direkt die individuellen Rechte und damit das Prinzip tangieren, auf denen die Demokratie beruht. Im Ausnahmezustand werden die Individuen – durch die Suspension ihrer Rechte – nicht als Mitglieder einer demokratischen Gemeinschaft (demos), sondern als Bestandteile einer zu sichernden Bevölkerung betrachtet. Befähigen die individuellen Rechte die Menschen dazu, Teil eines demoszu sein, forciert der Ausnahmezustand dagegen eine Politik der Bevölkerung. In meinem Aufsatz zeige ich, inwiefern individuelle Rechte allerdings nicht allein im Zustand ihrer Beschränkung, sondern auch ihrer Gewährung als Mittel genutzt werden können, um Bevölkerung zu regulieren. Hierzu beschreibe ich im Rückgriff auf die frühneuzeitliche Geschichte individueller Rechte eine spezifische Form ihrer Entfremdung, die in einer Spaltung innerhalb der Rechte besteht: in der Trennung ihres privaten von ihrem politischen Moment. In dieser Entfremdung liegt die Möglichkeit für einen dialektischen Umschlag vom demoszur bloßen Bevölkerung, der sich im Ausnahmezustand in extremer Form realisiert. Ausnahmezustand und individuelle Rechte erscheinen vor diesem Hintergrund in einem ungewohnten, doch für ihr Verständnis entscheidenden Verhältnis. Dieses Verständnis hat auch praktische Konsequenzen, denn um dem Missbrauch von Ausnahmemaßnahmen entgegenzutreten, ist es gerade notwendig, auf dem unlösbaren Zusammenhang des privaten und des politischen Moments individueller Rechte zu insistieren – und das heißt, den Bereich der Demokratie zu erweitern.

Keywords: state of exception, population, freedom, security, Michel Foucault.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

CfA: 3rd Young Researchers Workshop on Terrorism and Belligerency in Haifa

The Minerva Center for the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions (RLEC) at the University of Haifa, Faculty of Law and the Geography and Environmental Studies Department, invite submissions for participation in the third young researchers workshop on “Terrorism and Belligerency”. The workshop will be held from February 3-17, 2019, at the Minerva Center, University of Haifa.

Subject-Matter of Workshop
Following the success of the first two workshops held in September 2016 (see here), and February 2018 (see here), the Minerva Center for RLEC is planning a third young researcher’s workshop in February 2019. Papers are welcomed on theoretical or practical legal issues related to terrorism and belligerency from varied perspectives, such as: history, philosophy, sociology, geography, technology, economics, and politics. A non-exhaustive list of possible subjects includes:
• National law applicable to dealing with situations of high and low intensity belligerency (international and non-international armed conflicts).
• International law applicable to dealing with situations of high and low intensity belligerency (international and non-international armed conflicts).
• Law applicable to counter-terrorism efforts.
• Constitutional design for armed conflicts and counter-terrorism.
• Judicial review related to situations of counter-terrorism and belligerency.Application of constitutional or international human rights protection in situations of armed conflict and counter-terrorism.
• Legal aspects of economic and sociological developments in counter-terrorism situations.
• Geographical scope of application to counter-terrorism and belligerency legal regimes.
• Legal aspects of the use of advance technologies in the battlefield or for counter-terrorism purposes.
• Application of “Just War” doctrine in situations of armed conflict and counter-terrorism.Purpose of Workshop
The purpose of this workshop is to convene a group of scholars for a high-level discussion on enduring and emerging questions on law and policy related to terrorism / belligerency. This workshop will offer participants a balanced combination of rigorous scholarly discussion and more relaxed social interaction.

Structure of Workshop
This workshop will feature twelve papers selected through this call. The expected formation will include twelve both from Israel and abroad. The workshop will be held over a 2 weeks period; participants from abroad will be offered residency in the university dormitories.
Workshop Sessions: The participants will convene 2-3 time a week for full day sessions of presentations and discussions. During each session, selected participants will present their papers to the workshop group (apx. 20-30 minutes). Senior researchers and practitioners will be invited to the sessions to provide feedback, as well as a weekly keynote presentation. Following each presentation there will be an open discussion among the workshop participants.
Field trip: The participants will be invited for field trips which include, inter alia, planned visits to relevant locations and institutions (such as the Israeli Supreme Court, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ofer Military Court, and the security wall) where they will meet with experts and practitioners dealing with issues related to terrorism and belligerency.

Respondents and Guest speakers
Each young researcher admitted to the workshop will be paired with a senior respondent. The respondent will provide the young researcher a thorough and productive feedback following the presentation of the paper. The organizing committee is putting a lot of efforts in finding the most suitable respondents to the specific presentations.

Eligibility
Submissions are invited from young researchers, namely PhD candidates, Post-Doctoral fellows, and scholars up to 5 years since the completion of their PhD.

Submission Instructions
Interested scholars should email an abstract of up to 500 words along with current CV by November 18, 2018 to the following address: minervaextreme@univ.haifa.ac.il. Researchers asking for support for travel expenses (see article 8 for details) should also submit a letter of request.
Abstracts should reflect papers that have not been published. Researchers should identify their submission with the following subject line: “Minerva Center— Terrorism and Belligerency Workshop 2019.”

Notification and Participation Requirements
Successful applicants will be selected by a Symposium Organizing Committee and notified no later than December 10, 2018.

Conditions
An invitation to participate in this Symposium will be issued to a participant on the following conditions:
(1) The participant agrees to submit an original, unpublished paper between 8,000 words and 12,000 words consistent with submission guidelines issued by the workshop conveners;
(2) The participant agrees to submit a full pre-workshop draft by January 13, 2019;
(3) The participant agrees to submit a full post-symposium final draft by September 1, 2019; and
(4) The participant agrees to acknowledge in future publication of his or her relevant paper, „the Minerva Center for RLEC at the Faculty of Law and the Geography and Environmental Studies Department, the University of Haifa“.

Costs
There is no cost to participate in the Workshop. Successful applicants are responsible for securing their own funding for travel and other incidental expenses, in accordance with the following information:
Travel: In order to enable submissions from young researchers coming from developing countries, distant locations or in unique circumstances, the Minerva Center will provide partial assistance to cover travel expenses. A request letter should be included in the submission.
Accommodation: Researchers from outside of Israel are expected to stay in Haifa during the workshop. The cost of accommodations at the dormitories for this period will be covered by the Minerva Center. Researchers who choose to extend their stay or to arrange for their own accommodations will be required to secure their own funding.
Food: Light refreshments, lunch and dinner will be available at the Minerva Center throughout the workshop sessions dates.

Streaming
In accordance with the ongoing practice of the Minerva RLEC, all of the young researchers workshop sessions will be live streamed and recorded online. We believe that almost any academic event should be live streamed and recorded, however this is not a mandatory requirement and every speaker can chose to opt-out from this option for his or her own presentation. For previous recordings please visit the Minerva RLEC YouTube page.

Questions
Please direct inquiries in connection with this Workshop to Adv. Ido Rosenzweig by email at ido.rose@gmail.com or telephone at +972-(0)-525516596. Please circulate this Call widely.

Workshop Organizing Committee
• Prof. Eli M. Salzberger, The Director of the Minerva Center RLEC
• Prof. Gad Barzilai, Vice Provost of the University of Haifa and Principal Investigator, Minerva Center RLEC
• Prof. Amnon Reichman, Principal Investigator, Minerva Center RLEC
• Prof. Deborah Shmueli, Principal Investigator, Minerva Center RLEC
• Dr. Itamar Mann, Principal Investigator, Minerva Center RLEC
• Dr. Michal Ben Gal, Research coordinator, Minerva Center for RLEC
• Adv. Ido Rosenzweig, Director of Research (Cyber, Terrorism & Belligerency) Minerva Center RLEC

New Normality? – Abstract #15

Julian Müller: European Human Rights Protection in Times of Terrorism—the State of Emergency and the Emergency Clause of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Like most human rights treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) contains an emergency clause (Art. 15 ECHR). This clause defines the conditions for—and the limits of—a derogation from the human rights obligations under the convention in the case of an emergency. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the state of emergency (état d’urgence) was declared in France and maintained in force till 1 November 2017. In many cases, the counterterrorism measures adopted by the French authorities interfered with the rights set forth in the Convention. The question arises as to whether the interference could be justified by the state of emergency or whether the Convention was violated. This article analyzes the most important groups of cases: house searches, house arrests, and bans on demonstrations. As a result, it can be shown that the situation in France satisfied the criteria for a lawful derogation from the ECHR. However, some of the actual measures seem to have gone beyond what was strictly necessary and, so, violated the Convention. This particular case may also give some indication of the role that international and European human rights regimes can play in balancing fundamental rights and measures in the “fight against terrorism.”

Menschenrechtsregime eine Notstandsklausel (Art. 15 EMRK). Diese Vorschrift regelt, unter welchen Voraussetzungen und in welchem Umfang Konventionsstaaten von den menschenrechtlichen Gewährleistungen im Notstandsfall abweichen können. Nach den Terroranschlägen in Paris vom 13. November 2015 wurde in Frankreich der Ausnahmezustand (état d’urgence) verhängt und bis zum 1. November 2017 mehrmals verlängert. Die von den französischen Sicherheitsbehörden ergriffenen Maßnahmen zur Terrorabwehr haben in vielen Fällen in Konventionsrechte von Bürgern eingegriffen. In diesen Fällen stellt sich die Frage, ob die Eingriffe durch den Ausnahmezustand gerechtfertigt waren oder die Konvention verletzt wurde. Dieser Artikel untersucht die Vereinbarkeit mit der EMRK für die drei wichtigsten Fallgruppen. Hausdurchsuchungen, Hausarrest und Versammlungsverbote. Im Ergebnis kann gezeigt werden, dass die Situation in Frankreich die Voraussetzungen für eine Derogation von der EMRK erfüllte. Einige der konkreten Maßnahmen griffen jedoch unverhältnismäßig in Konventionsrechte ein. Dieser spezielle Fall kann auch Hinweise darauf geben, welche Rolle internationale und europäische Menschenrechtsregime in der Abwägung von Grundrechten und Maßnahmen im „Kampf gegen den Terrorismus“ einnehmen können.

Keywords: European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 15 ECHR, état d’urgence/state of emergency, terrorism, France.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #14

Jan Christoph Suntrup: The Symbolic Politics of the State of Exception: Images and Performances.

This article discusses selected examples of the state of exception’s symbolic embeddedness and symbolic performances related to it. After suggesting a revision of a simplistic understanding of the term “symbolic politics” as developed by Murray Edelman and others who confine symbolic action mainly to the realm of deception and manipulation, the symbolic force of rhetoric in exceptional times will be demonstrated by looking at recent examples from the French context. In a next step, the article will shed light on typical rituals of community-building, reassurance, and resilience after terrorist attacks before turning to the staging of political leadership in times of emergency. Moreover, the ambivalent and controversial use of images in the course of the “War on Terror” will be addressed. Lastly, the symbolic side of securitization animated by emergency narratives, which comes to the fore in the building of new security walls and especially in the military reconstruction of large cities, will be discussed.

Dieser Artikel widmet sich ausgewählten Fällen, in denen die symbolische Einbettung des Ausnahmezustands und ihn begleitende symbolische Handlungen zur Geltung kommen. Im Anschluss an ein Plädoyer für eine Revision traditioneller Vorstellungen von „Symbolpolitik“, die im Anschluss an Murray Edelman und andere Autoren häufig ins Reich der Täuschung und Manipulation verwiesen wird, analysiert der Artikel zunächst zwei jüngere Beispiele aus Frankreich, die die symbolische Kraft der Rhetorik im Ausnahmezustand demonstrieren. Anschließend sollen typische Rituale der Gemeinschaftsbildung, kollektiven Selbstvergewisserung und Selbstbehauptung nach Terroranschlägen beleuchtet werden, bevor die Inszenierung politischer Führungskompetenzen in Ausnahmesituationen in den Fokus rückt. Der Analyse des ambivalenten und kontroversen Einsatzes von Bildern im Laufe des Kriegs gegen den Terror folgt schließlich ein Blick auf die symbolische Dimension der häufig auf den Ausnahmezustand rekurrierenden gegenwärtigen Sicherheitspolitik, die sich in neuen Mauern und Schutzwällen, aber auch besonders der militärischen Umgestaltung großer Städte zeigt.

Keywords: Symbolic Politics, Rituals, Staging of Authority, Friend/Enemy Distinction, Securitization.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.

New Normality? – Abstract #13

Dante Gatmaytan: Duterte, Judicial Deference, and Democratic Decay in the Philippines

Democracy in the Philippines is in a state of decay. As with many other nations, the Constitution contains provisions allowing the Chief Executive to place the country or any part thereof in a state of exception in case of emergencies. This, however, is not a problem because the Constitution likewise ordained a system of checks and balances. To stave off abuse, the Judiciary, a co-equal branch of the Executive, was empowered to review any exercise by the President of its emergency powers. This paper provides an analysis of recent jurisprudence to illustrate the refusal of the Supreme Court to play this vital role and its concomitant effect on democracy.

Die Demokratie auf den Philippinen befindet sich in einem Zustand des Verfalls. Wie bei vielen anderen Nationen enthält die Verfassung Bestimmungen, die es dem Chef der Exekutive erlauben, das Land oder einen Teil davon im Falle von Notfällen in einen Ausnahmezustand zu versetzen. Dies ist jedoch eigentlich kein Problem, da die Verfassung ebenfalls ein System der gegenseitigen Kontrolle vorsieht. Um Missbrauch abzuwehren, wurde die der Exekutive gleichberechtigte Judikative ermächtigt, jede Ausübung der Notstandsbefugnisse durch den Präsidenten zu überprüfen. Dieser Artikel bietet eine Analyse der jüngsten Rechtsprechung, um die Weigerung des Obersten Gerichtshofs zu veranschaulichen, diese wichtige Rolle wahrzunehmen und die damit einhergehenden Auswirkungen auf die Demokratie zu verdeutlichen.

Keywords: Duterte, judicial deference, democracy, emergency powers, constitution, martial law.

This article is part of the forthcoming issue Matthias Lemke  / Ece Göztepe / Olivier Cahn (Ed.), New Normality? State of Emergency as Contemporary Government Technique.